The rules of civil procedure are an essential part of modern litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court holds that "procedure" is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.1 As such, CR 1 provides that the civil rules are to be liberally construed to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." In construing the rules, the courts use the ordinary rules of statutory construction.2
The first consideration on reviewing a matter is whether the proposed action will further its "just" determination. The modern rules of civil procedure are intended to allow the court to reach the merits, as opposed to disposition on technical niceties.3 Similarly, "whenever possible, the rules of civil procedure should be applied in such a way that substance will prevail over form."4 While there are few Washington cases that discuss CR 1, federal cases can be used as persuasive authority.5
In general, the civil rules are to be construed to eliminate procedural traps and provide uniformity in judicial procedure.6 Further, application of the rules must be governed by pragmatic, nontechnical considerations whenever possible.7 The courts have substantial discretion in determining how to apply the civil rules to litigants.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the civil rules are to be administered with the ends of justice in mind and courts are vested with considerable discretion to regulate the proceedings before them in a manner consistent with equity and fairness.8 At least one federal court has held that interpretation and enforcement of the rules ensure that speedy and efficient administration of justice may be secured.9
In looking at the three elements of the CR 1 test, the first is whether the proposed action is just. "Justice" means that the courts should try to resolve matters on their merits whenever possible. But justice also requires "the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the Court in a timely fashion so that the defendant is not forced to defend against stale claims."10 Therefore, it could be argued that dismissal for a party's failure to follow the civil rules is "just" even where the case is not heard on the merits.
The next consideration under CR 1 is whether the proposed action will further the speedy determination of the action. This part of the CR 1 analysis may prevent duplicative discovery,11 result in dismissal of claims or defenses12 or force adherence with court-imposed deadlines.13 The Fourth Circuit has held that the terms of a pretrial order must be firmly and fairly enforced by the district judge if the order is to serve the purpose of pretrial management designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.14 However, "[t]he view that the pleading of cases is a game in which every miscue should be fatal is antithetic to the spirit of the ... rules."15
The final consideration is whether the proposed action will further the "inexpensive" determination of every action. This consideration also has been used to justify limiting discovery,16 granting summary judgment,17 denying amendment of pleadings18 and imposing CR 11 sanctions against a party.19
These cases suggest that the procedural rules are simply a set of recommendations that the courts may use to justify the granting or denying of relief. But this is not the case. The civil rules provide orderly means for disposing of litigation on its merits, and they should be followed and not ignored.20 The rules should be liberally construed, but they should not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations.21
CR 1's statement that the rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action does not require a court to totally ignore fundamental pleading requirements.22 In fact, some courts indicate that compliance with the civil rules is required and essential to the orderly administration of justice.23
It would seem that dismissal on procedural grounds goes against the spirit of the civil rules. But the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed Ôto secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'"24 The Supreme Court also has held that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to hear affidavits that were not filed in accordance with the civil rules.25
Based on these cases, it is important to argue to the court that a procedural motion furthers the goals set forth in CR 1 - the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the matter.
Matthew King is a partner with Tewell & King. His practice emphasizes litigation in the state and federal courts. He can be reached at 206-623-2369 or via e-mail at mking@tewell-king.com.
1 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).
2 State v. McIntyre, 92 Wn.2d 620, 600 P.2d 1009 (1979).
3 Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wn.2d 601, 609, 919 P.2d 1209 (1996).
4 Griffith v. Bellevue, 130 Wn.2d 189, 192, 922 P.2d 83 (1996).
5 Eberle v. Sutor, 3 Wn. App. 387, 475 P.2d 564 (1970).
6 Gott v. Woody, 11 Wn. App. 504, 524 P.2d 452 (1974).
7 Kohl v. Zemiller, 12 Wn. App. 370, 529 P.2d 861 (1974).
8 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964).
9 Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 38 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
10 McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 1998).
11 Harris v. Computer Assoc. Int'l., Inc., 204 F.R.D. 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Gluck v. Ansett Australia, Ltd., 204 F.R.D. 217 (D.D.C. 2001).
12 Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
13 Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2002).
14 Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984).
15 Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2004).
16 Jackson v. County of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653 (E.D. Cal. 1997); North River Ins. Co. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F.Supp. 1411 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
17 Arnett v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 1464 (D. Kan. 1996).
18 Welch v. Centex Home Equity Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (D. Kan. 2004).
19 Bastien v. R. Rowland & Co., 116 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
20 Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967).
21 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S. Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964).
22 McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513 (D. Md. 1977).
23 Smith v. U. S., 369 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1966).
24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
25 Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
