In 1987 the legislature adopted RCW 10.14, authorizing issuance of “civil antiharassment orders.” It was already a misdemeanor to threaten bodily harm to another, and a felony to threaten to kill another. The Legislature adopted RCW 10.14 to permit a petitioner to obtain a civil order prohibiting any contact from the respondent, with criminal penalties for any “willful” violations of the order.

Unlawful harassment is defined as “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” RCW 10.14.020. The conduct must be sufficient to cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person, and must actually cause the petitioner substantial emotional distress. RCW 10.14.020.

Factors to determine whether a “course of conduct” constituted “harassment” include whether the respondent initiated the conduct and whether the petitioner had given notice that further contact was unwanted. RCW 10.14.030. It is not necessary to tell the respondent to stop further contact before obtaining a civil antiharassment order, however.

The petitioner may obtain an ex parte temporary order for up to two weeks, and then at a hearing on the merits may obtain an order good for up to one year (or a permanent order). RCW 10.14.080. The court “shall” enter the order if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that harassment, as defined in the statute, has occurred. RCW 10.14.080.

The order may prohibit attempting to contact by any means (including in person, by mail, or by phone), attempting to keep the petitioner under surveillance, and coming within a stated distance from the petitioner’s home or workplace. The court may also order the respondent to pay filing fees, service costs, and the petitioner’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. RCW 10.14.090. The respondent apparently may not obtain such an award if the order is not entered, which makes it relatively risk-free to file for an order. Willful violations by a person over eighteen constitute a gross misdemeanor. RCW 10.14.170. The statute has a “savings” provision to prevent it from being used to restrict constitutionally protected activities. The order must be served after the court hearing to be effective. It’s a wise practice to have the respondent served in court and have mention of the service docketed; further service is then unnecessary.

The statute originally conferred jurisdiction only on the District Courts. In State v. Brennan, the Court of Appeals held that an antiharassment order hearing was a trial in equity and the statute violated the Washington State Constitution, which conferred equity jurisdiction solely on the Superior Courts. State v. Brennan, 76 Wn.App. 347, 884 P.2d 1343 (1994). The statute was subsequently amended to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Superior and District courts, to preserve the ability to bring the proceeding in District Courts.

A respondent who sends a settlement letter to the petitioner as recommended by the Small Claims Court brochure, after issuance of an order, may nonetheless be convicted because such an offer is not a “mandatory step” in the litigation. Seattle v. Megrey, 93 Wn.App. 391, 968 P.2d 900 (1998). This holding demonstrates an important point-after issuance of an order, any contact is prohibited, even if the contact is civil and innocuous. The court in this case held that due process requires access to the courts, but due process requires only “reasonable access.” Id. at 394.

Companions of protected persons are not protected by the antiharassment order, so the order should name all persons to be protected, including household members or other companions. Burchell v. Thibault, 74 Wn. App. 517, 874 P.2d 196 (1994). In other words, the scienter element of the cause of action refers not only to harassing conduct, but to the specific target of the harassment. Id. at 522.

Also, a restriction on contacts and picketing has been held to be a “time, place and manner” restriction on free speech that does not violate the constitutional prohibition on prior restraint. “The statute is content neutral-no contact-whether profession of love, screams of hate, or anything in between. The interest to be served is the safety, security, and peace of mind of the victim.” State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 41, 9 P.3d 858 (2000). Noah held that enforcement of such an order does not constitute “state action.” The court distinguished Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed.1161 (1948), which held that enforcement of a privately-drafted racially restrictive covenant did constitute state action. The Noah court held that the Shelley court was engaged in more than “mere” enforcement, because it inquired into the identity of purchasers and the scope of the covenants. Of course, the court in an antiharassment enforcement action must inquire into the identity of the respondents and the scope of the civil antiharassment order. The holding is puzzling but remains good law.

Photographing and videotaping the petitioner even in public may also be prohibited, since these acts constitute evidence of surveillance. State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 9 P.3d 858 (2000). Furthermore, a party may waive his or her constitutional rights by agreeing to an antiharassment order as part of a settlement agreement. Id. at 51. This makes sense, as a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial, and plead guilty, even where the consequences of doing so include incarceration or the death penalty, which forfeit the most serious of constitutional rights.

Once an order is entered, prosecutors in a criminal setting may enforce it. The defendant will have several defenses available, however. Proper service must be proven. An antiharassment order which prevents the respondent from peacefully occupying his own property, or using a necessary public street, may be unenforceable.

When our clients’ relationships turn painful or poisonous, we can help them end further interactions and get on with their lives through this simple tool. It is particularly powerful to bring harassing voicemails, or harassing letters, into court. Such evidence is all admissions of a party opponent, and it is likely to be persuasive. Properly used, RCW 10.14 gives us an effective way to give our clients relief from interactions that seriously trouble them.